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PEOPLE IN URBAN China travel, move house 
and commute longer distances than ever before. 
They also enjoy greater opportunities to change 
their lifestyles or move up the social ladder. The 
gradual removal of historical bans imposed by the 
Communist Party on unauthorised movement be-
tween cities (or from the countryside to the city) 
as well as owning property and travelling abroad 
make the ease of movement — mobility — novel 
and exciting.   
Over the past year and a half, the anti-
corruption campaign has identified ‘excessive 
mobility’, as defined by all forms of ‘extravagance’ 
铺张 or 奢靡 on the part of party and government 
officials, as being a danger to the wellbeing of 
the party-state. New prohibitions and regulations 
have put pressure on party and government 
officials to change their habits, alter their lifestyles 
and abandon any plans to establish a residential 
base overseas — in effect, to retreat from the 
Zeitgeist of mobility. This chapter considers the 
implications for the Shared Destiny of the Chinese 
in the context of movement between China and 
the world, particularly in relation to the Party’s 
seemingly stringent anti-waste regulations.
Image: Chinese tourists at Uluru, Central Australia
Source: Northern Territory Tourism
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A New Austerity
In November 2013, the Third Plenary Session of 
the Eighteenth Party Central Committee approved 
what are formally known as ‘Party and Govern-
ment Regulations for Strict Economic Practices to 
Combat Waste’ 党政机关厉行节约反对浪费条例. The 
regulations, divided into twelve chapters and cov-
ering sixty-five items, outlined in great detail the 
management of government funds for everything 
from official travel, receptions and meetings to the 
use of vehicles and the renovation or construction 
of public buildings. This was the fourth tranche of 
bans and regulations issued since 2012 aimed at 
reforming and remoulding official conduct. They 
complemented and extended the ‘Twenty-six Item Directive’ or ‘Rules on 
Party and Government Domestic Official Business Reception Management’ 
党政机关国内公务接待管理规定 of December 2013; the January 2013 stip-
ulations known as the ‘Cage of Regulations’ 制度的笼子; and, the Decem-
ber 2012 ‘Eight Rules on Official Behaviour’ 八项规定 that were a feature 
of China Story Yearbook 2013.
The new raft of regulations prescribed correct practices in mind- 
numbing detail and highlighted existing problems of official conduct. 
They targeted lavish dining out, banquets and receptions, gift-giving, pub-
lically funded travel and the perks that go with it. The prescriptions (and 
proscriptions) in each and every category will slow down growth in the 
urban economy, especially the service industries, such as restaurants and 
hotels, as well as the urban environment and the experience of living in 
Chinese cities more generally. 
Among other things, the regulations specifically prohibited: bribery in 
all forms, including accepting expensive gifts; hiding illegally obtained in-
come; misusing government funds; charging non-official fees and tourism 
in the guise of official travel. They ban local initiatives including celebra-
Rules on Party and 
Government Domestic 
Official Business Reception 
Management
Photo: xinxi1.yymcc.com
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tions of local culture and the manufacture of products that have not been 
approved by higher authorities. They also proscribe non-approved chang-
es to the administrative divisions, that is, the subnational boundaries, of 
governing districts. They demand that officials vacate non-standard office 
spaces, including long-term leases in hotels, and ban the construction of 
large and lavish new offices. Moreover, local governments must not, as 
they have taken to doing on a grand scale, build flash new urban land-
marks 城市地标 or large-scale plazas.
The regulations promote budget restraint, rigorous audit practices, 
market price-based expenditure, the market reform of official vehicle pro-
curement, and a two-tier, central and provincial-level approval process 
for related decisions that had previously only needed to be approved lo-
cally. They encourage the conservation of energy and resources, including 
of equipment and furnishings — no need to update computer laptops to 
the latest model or redecorate for no good reason. Government bureaus 
should adopt the ‘paperless office’ and co-ordinate to prevent duplication 
of functions. Propaganda or party PR departments must ‘promote the con-
The newly approved ‘Party and Government Regulations for Strict Economic Practices to Combat Waste’ forbade 
lavish dining out, banquets and receptions, gift-giving, publically funded travel and the perks that go with it
Photo: Frank Müller/Flickr
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cept of green, low-carbon consumption and a healthy and civilised life-
style’ 倡导绿色低碳消费理念和健康文明生活方式. The Party will conduct 
on-site disciplinary inspections — including unannounced or spontaneous 
inspections — and investigate tips received from the public regarding offi-
cial breaches of these published rules and regulations.
Yet contradictions abound. On the one hand, the anti-corruption 
campaign purports to promote market competition, which means that 
the state should not control production and that entrepreneurs should 
be free to establish businesses small or large. On the other hand, it 
demands the standardisation of consumption practices at all levels of 
society. It strengthens the visible hand of the Party while simultaneously 
encouraging and frustrating the less visible hand of the market. 
The anti-waste campaign seeks to curb dining out on the public 
purse. Article Twelve of the ‘Twenty-six Item Directive’ prohibits the 
consumption of shark fins, birds’ nests and endangered animals, as well as 
spending government funds on cigarettes and liquor. The campaign also 
targets consumption that is beyond the public gaze, banning officials from 
frequenting or belonging to private 
clubs (see the China Story Yearbook 
2013: Civilising China, Information 
Window ‘Bathtime: Clamping Down 
on Corruption’, p.104). Inspectors 
have identified upscale private clubs 
and restaurants in public parks 
and heritage sites for closure and 
corrective action. In January 2014, 
the Beijing Municipal Government 
listed twenty-four such clubs and 
restaurants operating in public 
parks, some in dynastic-era heritage 
buildings, including in Beihai Park 
In December 2013, Xi Jinping took his austerity 
program into the streets, eating at the Qingfeng 
Steamed Bun Outlet in Beijing’s Chaoyang dis-
trict, one in a chain of such restaurants 
Photo: Weibo
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in central Beijing. It ordered 
them to suspend business and 
‘adjust their way of thinking’ 
调整思路. The Hangzhou West 
Lake government also ordered 
luxury restaurants to close or 
develop new business models 
with moderately priced menus.
In December 2013, Xi Jin-
ping took his austerity pro-
gram into the streets, eating 
at the Qingfeng Steamed Bun 
Outlet 庆丰包子铺  in Beijing’s 
Chaoyang district. He appeared 
to have arrived alone, ordered 
at the counter, paid twenty-one 
yuan (US$3.50) for the meal and carried his tray to a table. Following his 
visit, to which the official media gave much publicity, customers flocked 
to the restaurant to order the ‘Chairman’s Combo’ 主席套餐, a value meal 
of six steamed buns, a cold green vegetable and a soup of pig’s liver and 
intestines. The owner, concerned with crushing competition for ‘Xi’s Seat’, 
removed the table at which he sat as if it were an iconic object. 
Yet if the image of Xi eating at the Qingfeng Steamed Bun Outlet seems 
to support small-scale entrepreneurs in the market economy, the reality 
is somewhat different. The Qingfeng chain is a subsidiary of the Huatian 
Group, a state-owned conglomerate that was co-founded by Beijing’s 
Xicheng District Government and the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council. The complex relationship 
between the state and the market results in many such examples in 
which private enterprise and state ownership coexist. For example, 
when corporations, not official bodies, sponsor banquets, the anti-waste 
Xi Jinping eating a value meal subsequently dubbed the 
‘Chairman’s Combo’
Photo: Weibo
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regulations don’t apply — yet the corporation itself may well be wholly or 
jointly state-owned.
Curbing Excess at Home but Not Abroad? 
While aimed at bolstering the Party’s legitimacy with the people and 
targeting official waste and corruption, the austerity campaign has also 
affected the relationships between political and economic elites, who 
together set trends in the urban consumer economy through their social 
relations and exchanges of favours. 
Just two years ago many foreign luxury firms had planned to expand 
their businesses widely in China. But sales for international brands began 
A French luxury goods conglomerate that owns Möet & Chandon and Louis Vuitton reported that sales 
growth in China had dropped from ten to twenty percent to just five percent in 2013
Photo: us.moet.com
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to decrease in 2013 and by 2014 some luxury malls and international 
brand shops in Shanghai and Beijing had become consumer deserts. 
Although luxury brands continue to boost their profiles with bullish 
retail promotions and press releases, there is no doubt that conspicuous 
consumption has decreased as a result of the austerity campaign.
Yet by the first quarter of 2014, as global firms tracking luxury brands 
reported decreased sales in China, they noted that consumption of luxury 
goods by Chinese tourists overseas actually increased. In 2014, France, 
the home of many luxury brands, became the most favoured destination 
for middle-class Chinese tourists. It had already been high on the list of 
China’s wealthy, measured as the top wealthiest twenty-five percent of 
the country’s outbound tourists by income, who prefer it second only to 
Bling Loses its Sparkle, by Joanna (Yeejung) Yoon
In 2012, China spent its way past the USA to become the biggest luxury goods market in the 
world, according to the Business of Fashion website. However, the same article notes that 
the growth of China’s luxury market dropped to seven percent in 2012, down from more 
than thirty in previous years.
LVMH, a French luxury goods conglomerate that owns Möet & Chandon and Louis 
Vuitton, reported that sales growth in China has 
dropped from ten to twenty percent to just five 
percent in 2013. In the same period, Salvatore 
Ferragamo’s revenue growth in Asia halved to 
ten percent. When the price of shoemaker Tod’s 
shares fell seven percent, the company blamed 
declining demand in Asia. 
While industry says the anti-corruption cam-
paign is responsible for declining sales, changing 
tastes are also partly responsible: the ostenta-
tious embrace of luxury brands by déclassé nou-
veau riche has also taken some shine off the bling 
for the truly well-heeled. 
A lucky licence plate in China has become al- 
most as much a status symbol as a car. Super- 
stitious rich people spend a small fortune to 
purchase an auspicious plate. The luckiest 
number, and therefore most expensive, 
is eight, or ba, which rhymes with fa, the 
Chinese character for wealth
Photo: Patrick Streule/Flickr
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Australia, where the clean environment is 
the main draw.  
Having seen Paris, some wealthy 
Chinese tourists took to pursuing the 
red wines of Bordeaux and Burgundy to 
the source, visiting the great chateaux 
and buying wine, or even whole cellars. 
Other travellers, led predominantly by 
women, would head south to seek out the 
fabled colours of Provence. These regional 
landscapes — from the Route des Grands 
Cru, Dijon to Santenay, to the lavender 
fields of Aix-en-Provence — have become 
widely known and even reproduced in 
China. 
After the fashion model Zhang Xinyu 
张馨予 posted a photo of herself with a 
lavender-stuffed, lavender-coloured plush bear from a lavender estate in 
Nabowla, Tasmania (the south-eastern island state of Australia), Chinese 
tourists descended on the town en masse to snap up the same bear — orig-
inally created as a way to deal with excess lavender. The demand grew so 
intense that the lavender estate limited sales to one per person. Even a 
Chinese quarantine services ban on the bear failed to have any immediate 
effect on sales. 
Chinese citizens first gained the opportunity to travel outside the 
Mainland in the 1980s. In 1983, Hong Kong and Macao became the first 
places opened to Chinese tourists, but they could only travel as part of an 
organised tour. In 2003, in response to the SARS (Severe Acute Respira-
tory Syndrome, or ‘avian flu’) crisis, which caused a meltdown in Hong 
Kong’s tourism industry and put many businesses in peril, Hong Kong im-
plemented an ‘individual visitor scheme’ to boost mainland tourism. Chi-
na’s middle class shoppers, discouraged from buying quality goods and 
Zhang Xinyu posted a photo of herself 
with a lavender-coloured plush bear 
from a lavender estate in Tasmania. 
Chinese tourists descended on the 
town en masse to snap up the same 
bear
Photo: Zhang Xinyu/Weibo
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luxury brand products in China because import duties and consumption 
taxes had made them far too expensive, found the same goods in Hong 
Kong’s shopping malls — tax free. If the individual visitor scheme intro-
duced new possibilities for travel and consumption, it was a privilege that 
was unevenly distributed. Just as the first economic experiments of Deng 
Xiaoping’s program of Reform and Opening Up were first trialled in the 
Special Economic Zones of Shenzhen in the south before being extended 
to coastal cities and finally interior provinces, from south to north and 
east to west, the individual visitor scheme initially allowed independent 
travel only to residents of certain places in Guangdong. Later, this was 
extended to Beijing and Shanghai. Shenzhen, on the Hong Kong border, 
was able uniquely to offer multiple-entry visas for Hong Kong beginning 
in 2009. 
WHERE THE ECONOMIC ELITE 
WENT IN 2013*
1.   Australia
2.  France
3.  Dubai
4.  Switzerland
5.  Maldives
6.  United States
7.   Japan
8.  Germany
9.   Singapore
10.  New Zealand
*Defined as the top twenty-
six percent by income of 
‘outbound tourists’.
Australia was mainland China’s most popular 
travel destination in 2013
Photo: Northern Territory Tourism
Data source: 2013 survey by FT (Financial Times) China Confidential survey 
of 1,227 middle income consumers in ten first- and second-tier cities. 
http://www.ftchinaconfidential.com/outbound2013
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During this time, the government gradually relaxed restrictions on 
travel by Chinese nationals to other countries. Through the 1990s, ‘ap-
proved destinations’ were confined to the Asia and Pacific region, with 
Australia and New Zealand being added to the list in 1999. Most European 
countries became approved destinations in 2004–2005, the United States in 
2008 (by which time there were ninety-five countries on the list) and Can-
ada in 2010. In 2013, Rwanda became the 116th country to make the list.
Exceptional Zones: Hong Kong and Macao
While mainland Chinese tourists boost the economies of their destina-
tions, their arrival has not always been greeted with joy. In January 2014, 
the Hong Kong Secretary for Commerce and Development Gregory So 
Kam-leung 蘇錦樑 sparked public consternation when he claimed that 
Hong Kong, an urban area with a population of 7.2 million, could receive 
as many as seventy million tourists annually within three years, and up 
to one hundred million by 2023. In 2013, 40.8 million of the year’s annual 
54.3 million visitors arriving in Hong Kong came from mainland China.
‘Mr. 689’ is the nickname Hong Kongers have given CY Leung, installed as Chief Executive of Hong Kong in 2012 with 
689 votes by China’s elite electoral committee. It became the unoffical symbol of the Hong Kong protests in 2014
Photo: hk.apple.nextmedia.com
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 There had already been both media criticism of and protests against 
Mainlanders (‘locusts’) for the bad manners that some displayed and the 
negative impact of mainland tourism in general (see the China Story Year-
book 2013: Civilising China, Forum ‘Civilised Tourism’, p.14). In March 
2014, a particularly theatrical protest saw about one hundred people 
wearing Cultural Revolution-style costumes, waving red flags and holding 
posters with the Hong Kong Chief Executive CY Leung’s 梁振英 face ‘photo-
shopped’ onto Mao Zedong’s body as they shouted slogans like ‘Love your 
country — buy Chinese products’ 愛國愛國貨. In response to this popular 
backlash, in May 2014, the New China News Agency published a list of 
‘do’s and don’ts’ for Mainlanders planning a visit to Hong Kong. The intro-
duction to these guidelines reminded travellers that, ‘when you go some-
where, follow local custom’ 入乡随俗, elaborating on differences in daily 
life between the Mainland and Hong Kong.
Another concern is economic. In March 2014, The Economist 
named Hong Kong number one on its new ‘crony-capitalism index’, by 
a wide margin. The index tracks economic activity susceptible to ‘rent-
seeking’, which it defines as ‘grabbing a bigger slice of the pie rather than 
WHERE MIDDLE-CLASS TOURISTS 
WANTED TO GO IN 2014
1.  France
2.  United Kingdom
3.  Italy
4.  Germany
5.  Hong Kong
Data source: Hurun Report 2014, People’s 
Daily Online, retrieved 26 January 2014
6.  Japan
7.  United States
8.  Singapore
9.  South Korea
10.  Switzerland
Chinese tourists are buying up infant milk powder 
everywhere they can get it. In Hong Kong the 
phenomenon has resulted in widespread shortages. 
Hong Kong authorities have imposed a two-tin export 
restriction on mainland Chinese tourists
Photo: voanews.com
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making the pie bigger’, and which often 
involves businesses gaining advantages 
over competitors as a result of political 
connections. It cites both Hong Kong and 
Singapore for their ‘role as entrepôt for 
shiftier neighbours’.
Local authorities are also concerned 
about mainland visitors engaging in prac-
tices aimed at circumventing Chinese law, 
including the anti-waste regulations and 
the anti-corruption campaign. Some visi-
tors make fraudulent use of UnionPay cards 
to circumvent Chinese laws restricting the 
amount of foreign currency a citizen can 
legally take out of the country. UnionPay is 
China’s only domestic bankcard. It is used 
by all banks in China and operates with the 
approval of the People’s Bank of China. It 
is widely accepted by ATMs in Hong Kong 
and Macao. 
In 2006, Macao beat Las Vegas to take the 
title of biggest gambling centre in the world. 
By 2013, official figures for gaming revenue 
in Macao reached an unprecedented US$45 
billion. But an estimated further US$90 
billion in unreported income, twice the 
official total, came from the illegal use of 
UnionPay cards. The most common ruse is 
to pay for jewellery or other luxuries via UnionPay and then return the 
items for cash. The second type of fraud involves the use of handheld 
UnionPay terminals registered on the Mainland and smuggled into Macao 
in order to record transactions as domestic. 
WHAT’S IN AND WHAT’S OUT
IN      
Eating in       
Simple dishes
Spending time with family
Cars bought retail 
Budget determines spending  
Visits to the grassroots  
Limited retinue
Short meetings
Plain wrapping
‘Ordinary’ facilities 
Thrifty leadership 
Recycle-reuse
OUT
Eating out
Exotic meats
Expending time in clubs  
State-subsidised vehicles
Spending determines budget
Travel outside one’s jurisdiction 
Large entourages    
Long conferences
Gaudy packaging
‘Image’ projects
Flashy conduct
Latest model
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In May 2014, the unprecedented growth of UnionPay card use in Ma-
cao raised concerns in Beijing that, as reported by the Macau Business 
Daily, ‘tens of billions of yuan in illicit funds are being funnelled out of 
the Mainland and into casinos in direct contravention of national curren-
cy controls’. UnionPay quickly announced measures to ‘combat overseas 
money laundering [and] capital flight’. The Macao Monetary Authority 
ordered casinos and shopping malls to search out and remove all unreg-
istered UnionPay card machines. Subsequent media reports indicate that 
mainland visitors still commonly use UnionPay in Macao, but casinos and 
shops have not been able to add new payment terminals and there is on-
going official scrutiny. 
Globalisation of Capital and Residency Schemes
Ever since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, well-heeled Chinese 
have invested in the housing market in many of the world’s most desirable 
cities. Wealthy investors ‘rationally overpay’ to park capital in real estate 
that then routinely lies vacant. The decision to invest in property overseas 
is not surprising. In China, property reverts to the state after seventy years; 
there is no such thing as ownership in perpetuity. According to the global 
real estate services firm Jones Lang La-
Salle, Chinese investment in real estate 
abroad increased by twenty-five percent 
in the first quarter of 2014 over the pre-
vious year to a total of US$2.1 billion. 
Among the most popular cities 
with cashed-up Chinese investors 
are those where housing is the least 
affordable: Hong Kong, Vancouver, 
Sydney, San Francisco, San Jose (Silicon 
Valley), Melbourne, New York, London, 
‘Naked officials’: Party and government offi-
cials who send their families and suspicious 
fortunes to Hong Kong or Western countries, 
including tax havens with no extradition 
treaty with China, without a legitimate 
work-related reason
Photo: Weibo
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Los Angeles and Auckland. As a result, in many of these cities there is 
concern that Chinese investment is pushing housing prices out of the 
reach of local residents. In February 2014, Canada cancelled its Immigrant 
Investment Program, which had some 65,000 pending applications, seventy 
percent of which were from China, claiming that the scheme had under- 
valued Canadian permanent residency. 
In Australia, there have been conflicting reports on the impact of 
foreign investment, of which Chinese investment is a significant part, on 
the real estate market. The law holds that non-residents are allowed to 
purchase only new-build housing (thus stimulating construction), while 
some figures suggest that non-resident purchases also factors in the 15.4 
percent rise in housing prices in Sydney and 9.2 percent rise in Melbourne 
over the twelve months to June 2014. A parliamentary inquiry into the 
effect of foreign buyers on Australian real estate prices has suggested 
new rules and stricter enforcement of existing rules, while reported 
reactions among ‘cashed-up foreign real estate investors view the existing 
$85,000 fine for buying existing dwellings just a cost of doing business’.
  A financial industry survey found that forty-seven percent of ‘high 
net worth’ individuals planned to move overseas. From the standpoint of 
those running the anti-corruption campaign, the problem is that Chinese 
investing overseas includes government officials whose incomes should 
not allow it. A survey by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences revealed 
that half of the party and government officials at provincial and county 
levels were considering how to acquire foreign nationality or residency 
for their children. Bureaucrats whose spouses, children — and assets — 
have been moved abroad are called ‘naked officials’ 裸体官员, known 
colloquially as luoguan 裸官 (see Forum ‘Chinese Families Going Global?’, 
p.230). According to the Global Financial Integrity Group, which monitors 
illegal money flows, no less than US$3 trillion had been illicitly spirited out 
of China in the six years to 2011. 
In a 2013 speech on the drive for clean government (‘honest and clean 
party and government rule’ 党风廉政), Wang Qishan, head of the Cen-
This content downloaded from 138.25.78.25 on Sat, 11 Nov 2017 23:16:36 UTC
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tral Commission for Discipline Inspection, previewed measures to bring 
China’s 1.18 million ‘naked officials’ into line. Wang identified how the 
problem of nepotism, like all forms of corruption, interferes with the de-
velopment and operation of the market. But his observation exposes the 
contradiction between party-state expectations for political elites and the 
rational choices individuals make in the global market.
The Hong Kong Capital Investment Entrance Scheme bars applicants 
from China but makes an exception for Chinese nationals who have per-
manent residence in another country. For a fee of HK$200,000 (US$25,800) 
Hong Kong immigration agents help mainland citizens obtain residency 
permits in other countries with lax requirements for residency so that 
they can take advantage of this loophole. Of more than 17,000 mainland 
WHEN IN HONG KONG: RULES FOR MAINLAND TOURISTS
DO
Keep clear of roads and avoid blocking paths
Speak softly
Refrain from bumping or pushing people
Avoid greeting people loudly from  
a distance
Treat service staff politely
Avoid excessive bargaining
DON’T
Drink or eat on the MTR 
Smoke in a non-smoking area
Litter or spit on the ground
Cross the road against a red light
Forget to wear your seatbelt in a taxi
Ride in the first-class train carriage  
without paying 
Source: Xinhua News Agency, 9 May 2014 
Mainland Chinese tourists are the subject of global 
criticism. The Chinese government has issued guide-
lines on how to travel abroad 
Source: Xinhuanet.com
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WHERE CHINESE TRAVELLERS GO
Approved Destination Status agreements with China, by year. 
Year   Destination
1983 Hong Kong, Macao
1988   Thailand  
1990   Malaysia, Singapore
1992   Philippines
1998   South Korea
1999   Australia, New Zealand
2000   Brunei, Cambodia, Japan, Myanmar, Vietnam 
2002   Egypt, Indonesia, Malta, Nepal, Turkey
2003   Croatia, Cuba, Germany, Hungary, India, Maldives, Pakistan, South Africa,  
Sri Lanka
2004   Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, 
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Seychelles, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
2005   Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Fiji, Jamaica, Lao PDR, Mexico,   
Northern Mariana Islands, Peru, Russia, United Kingdom, Vanuatu
2006   Bahamas, Grenada, Mongolia, Tonga
2007   Andorra, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Uganda, Morocco, Monaco, Namibia, 
Venezuela, Oman, Syria
2008   French Polynesia, Israel, Taiwan, United States
2009   Cape Verde, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Guyana, Mali, Montenegro, 
Papua New Guinea, United Arab Emirates
2010   Canada, Lebanon, Federated States of Micronesia, North Korea, Uzbekistan, Serbia
2011   Iran
2012   Madagascar, Cameroon, Colombia, Samoa
2013   Rwanda
Source: Chinese National Tourism Association (www.cnta.gov.cn)
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Chinese investors in the Hong Kong scheme, a group that constitutes 
eighty-seven percent of the total, 13,300 have residency papers from Gam-
bia and Guinea-Bissau. In the third quarter of 2013, applicants for Hong 
Kong’s program more than doubled from the previous year to 3,380, a 
record high. Officials from the People’s Republic may apply with civilian 
mainland identity cards while maintaining household registration status 
and businesses in China. 
Applications from mainland students to Hong Kong universities have 
also increased significantly, including applications from mature-age stu-
dents. In the 2010s, the proportion of postgraduate students from main-
land China studying at Hong Kong universities increased to more than 
half. In the academic year 2011–2012, out of fewer than 7,000 postgraduate 
students at Hong Kong universities, 4,298 were from China. By 2012–2013, 
the number increased to 4,586. Most pursue master’s programs in busi-
ness, finance, accountancy and other professional degrees. The postgradu-
ate visa is a more economical way to obtain Hong Kong residency than the 
capital investment scheme. It allows graduates one year to find a job and, 
after another six years, the opportunity to apply for permanent residency. 
After Canada cancelled its popular (and relatively low-cost) Immi-
grant Investment Program, similar schemes in Australia, Europe and the 
US became even more popular. In November 2012, Australia introduced 
the Significant Investor Visa, which mandated an investment of AU$5 mil-
lion in a local business or approved managed funds for those who would 
want to obtain permanent residency. Within a year, eighty-five percent of 
the applications came from mainland Chinese. In October 2014, the Aus-
tralian government went even further, announcing a new ‘premium’ in-
vestor visa for applicants investing AU$15 million or more in the country, 
who can then get permanent residence in one year.
 In Europe, the direct purchase of real estate entitles the buyer to res-
ident status in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Cyprus. In 2012, Portugal intro-
duced a ‘318 Golden Visa’; this allows the granting of permanent residency 
after five years and EU residency after an additional one year for buyers of 
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real estate with a value greater than €500,000. In the first year, 248 of 400 
successful applicants came from China. 
In August 2014, the US State Department announced that the annual 
quota of investment visas for permanent residency in the United States 
had filled early, with Chinese investors making up eighty percent of the 
year’s allocation. Demand from China for the US scheme exceeds that from 
any other county, and it increased after Canada shut down its program.
Conclusion
When the Party launches a political campaign, superficial or at least sta-
tistically evident results can be quick. But such campaigns have histori-
cally played out only in China itself. The current austerity campaign has 
implications for the behaviour of Chinese elites and officials in a global 
context. In October 2014, the Australian Federal Police revealed they were 
working with their Chinese counterparts to seize the assets of corrupt of-
ficials who had brought hundreds of millions of dollars of illicit earnings 
into Australia.
How will political and economic elites react to the new pressures for 
clean government in relation to the way they take up global opportuni-
ties? How will regulations set by the Party work in an era of international 
capital mobility? What are their implications for national loyalties, food 
security and environmental quality at home and abroad?
As noted elsewhere in this volume, the anti-corruption campaign os-
tensibly sought to clear the way for the implementation of a new wave of 
economic reforms. Its anti-waste directives expose and address popular 
outrage at official corruption and excess consumption. But it also reveals 
fundamental contradictions in a political-economic system in which the 
state embraces market discourses and desires rather than focusing on the 
establishment and long-term maintenance of viable market institutions. 
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The political campaign is unlikely to be able to rein in the new urban mo-
bility. 
Domestic and international mobility in China has increased 
dramatically over the past thirty years. The impending loosening and 
reform of the once-strict household registration system will grant legal 
residency status to millions of urban migrants; it will address the problems 
of the urban underclass and increase their potential for social mobility 
in China’s burgeoning cities. At the same time, urban professionals are 
growing anxious about the future in which they share social welfare 
with millions of new urban citizens. New constellations of mobility make 
the cities of the outside world, by comparison, desirable and realistic 
destinations and sites of comparative possibility. The Shared Destiny 
of groups and classes in China extends their desire to embrace a global 
destiny — the ramifications of which are hard to predict. 
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